This paper examines time-series patterns of externa! financing decisions and shows that publicly traded U.S, firms fund a much larger proportion of their financing deficit with external equity when the cost of equity capital is low. The historical values of the cost of equity capital have long-lasting effects on fimis" capital structures through their influence on firms' historical financing decisions. We also introduce a new econometric technique In deal with biases in estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. We find lliat firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed, with a half-life of 3.7 years lor btwk leverage, even after controlling for the traditional dctenninants of capital structure and firm tixed effects.
I. Introduction
The three preetninent theories of capital sttitcture are the static trade-oif, |)ecking order, and tnarket timing models. Other studies have examined the relalive merits of static trade-off and pecking order theories. In this paper we present empirical evidence regarding the relative importance of all three of these hypotheses. Using a direct measure of the equity risk premium (ERP), we find that U.S. firms during are much more likely to use external equity financing when the relative cost of equity is low. Furthermore, ERPs have long-lived effects on capital structure through their influence on securities issuance decisions, even
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after controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure, consisteni with the hypothesis that market timing is an important determinant of observed capital structures, After further controlling for firm fixed effects and correcting for biases that are created by some of the firms being present for only a .short pan of the sample period and leverage ratios being highly persistent, we find that firms adjust toward their target leverage at a moderate speed. No single theory of capital structure is capable of explaining all of the timeseries and cross-sectional patterns that have been documented. The relative importance of these explanations has varied in different studies. In general, the pecking order theory enjoyed a period of ascendancy in the 1990s, but it has recently fallen on hard times. With the publication of Baker and Wurgler's (2002) article relating capital structure to past market-to-book ratios, the market timing theor\ has increasingly challenged both ihe static trade-off and pecking order iheories, A number of recent papers, however, challenge Baker and Wurgler's evidence thai securities issued in a year have long-lived effects on capital structure.
The market timing theory posits that corporate executives issue securities depending on the time-varying relative costs of equity and debt, and these issuance decisions have long-lasting effects on capital structure because the observed capital structure at date / is the outcome of prior period-by-period securities issuance decisions. According to the market timing theory, firms prefer equity when they perceive the relative cost of equity as low. and they prefer debt otherwise. The capital structure literature has. to date, refrained from explicitly measuring the cost of equity. A major contribution of this paper is to link securities issuance explicitly to the cost of equity capital, using a direct measure of the ERR Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) lest the pecking order theory by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using a firm's net debt issuance as the dependent variable and its net financing deficit as the independent variable. The\ find that the estimated coefficient on (he financing deficit is close to one for theit sample of 157 firms continuously listed during [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] , and they interpret the evidence as supportive of the pecking order theory. Frank and Goyal (2(X) 3). however, find that the coefficient on the financing deficit is far below one in the 1990s. We explore the role of changing market conditions in firms' changing financing bebavior. We find that our market condition proxies, especially a measure for the time-varying cost of equity capital, have an important impact on the estimated coefficient of the financing deficit.
To measure the relative cost of equity, we use the beginning-of-year implied HRP, estimated using forecasted earnings and long-term growth (LTG) rates. Consistent with the market fiming theory, we find that firms fund a large proportion of their financing deficit with external equity when the relative cost of equity is low. The magnitude of the effect is economically and statistically significant. For example, an increase from 3% to 4% in the implied ERP results in approximately 3% more (e.g., from 62% to 65%) of the financing deficit being funded with net debt. To our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically link the time series of financing choices to the time-varying ERP for a large sample of U.S. publicly traded firms.
After establishing the importance of market conditions for securities issuance, we examine the effect of historical ERFs on current leverage. We find that past ERPs have long-lasting effects on a firm's current capital structure through their influence on historical financing decisions. A firm funds a larger proportion of its financing deficit with debt when the market ERP is higher, resulting in higher leverage for many subsequent years. For example, a financing deficit that was of total assets in 1974, when the ERP was high, results in an increase of in hook leverage {e.g.. increasing from 47.09% to 50%) four years later, while a financing deficit of 10% in 1996, when the ERP was low, results in an increase of only 0.35% in book leverage four years later.
We also estimate the speed with which firms adjust toward target leverage. This is perhaps the most important issue in capital structure research today. If firms adjust quickly toward their target leverage, which changes across time as iirm characteristics and market conditions change, then historical financing activities and market conditions will have only short-lived effects on firms' current capital structures, implying that the market timing theory of capital structure is unimportant.
The existing literature has provided mixed results on the speed of adjustment (SOA) toward target financial leverage. Fama and French (2002) estimate an SOA of 7%-18% per year. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) find that capital structure is so persistent thai the cross-sectional distribution of leverage in the year prior to the initial public offering (IPO) predicts leverage 20 years later, yet they estimate a relatively rapid SOA of 25% per year for book leverage. Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate an even faster SOA: 35.5% per year using market leverage and 34.2% per year using book leverage, suggesting that it takes about 1.6 years for a firm to remove half of the effect of a shock on its leverage. Both Lcary and Roberts (2005) and Alti (2006) find that the effect of equity issuance on leverage completely vanishes within two to four years, suggesting fast adjustment toward target leverage. As Frank and Goyal (2008) state in their survey article; "Corporate leverage is mean reverting at the firm level. The speed at which this happens is not a settled issue" (p. 185).
We reconcile these different findings by showing that the estimated SOA in a dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects is sensitive to the econometric procedure employed when many of the firms are present for relatively brief periods, especially when a firm's debt ratio is highly autocorrelated. A traditional estimator for a dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects involves mean differencing the model. As Flannery and Rangan (2006) observe, however, the bias in the mean differencing estimate of the SOA can be substantial for a dynamic panel data set in which many firms have only a few years of data (the short time dimension bias). To reduce the bias. Flannery and Rangan (2006) rely on an instrumental variable in their mean differencing estimation, while Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) use a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. In the system GMM estimation, the model itself and the first difference of the model are estimated as a "system." The system GMM estimator, however, is hiased when the dependent variable is highly persistent, as is the case with debt ratios. Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) propose a long differencing estimator for highly persistent data series. In this estimator, a muitiyear différence of the model is taken rather than a one-year difference. Our simulations show that the long differencing estimate is much less biased than the OLS estimate ignoring firm fixed effects unless the true SOA is slow, in which case neither procedure has an appreciable bias. The long differencing estimate is also much less biased than ihe ñrm fixed effects mean differencing estimate unless the true SOA is fast, in which case neither procedure has an appreciable bias. Hahn et al. (2007) showthat the long differencing estimator is also much less biased than the system GMM estimator when the dependent variable is highly persistent (i.e., the true SOA is slow). In ¡I simulation, they show that if the true autoregressive parameter is 0.9. the system GMM estimate is only 0.664. whereas the long differencing estimator produces an estimate of 0.902 with a differencing length of k = 5.
Using the long differencing technique, we find that firms only slowly rebalance away tbe undesired effects of leverage shocks. Using a differencing length i)f A: = 8, the SOA is 17.0% per year for book leverage and 23.2% per year for market leverage. Such estimates suggest that it takes about 3.7 and 2.6 years for a firm to remove half of the effect of a shock on its book and market leverage, respectively. This is the most important result of this paper.
Throughout our empirical analysis, we do not give equal attention to the market timing, pecking order, and static trade-off models. This is because many of our findings are consistent with earlier research, and little purpose would be sened by long discussions that would largely repeat the existing literature. Instead, we focus on our new findings regarding time variation in the relative cost of equity as it relates to the pecking order and market timing hypotheses, on whether past securities issues have persistent effects on capital structure, and on the SOA to target leverage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section [I describes the data and summary statistics. Section III presents the empirical results of the roie of market timing in securities issuance decisions. Section IV examines the effects of securities issues on capital structure. Section V discusses econometric issues and presents estimates of the SOA to target capital structure using the long differencing estimator. Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Summary Statistics

A. Data
The firm-level data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. The sample consists of firms from 1963 to 2001. Since R&D (item 46) is missing for about 39% of firm years, we set tbe missing value to zero to avoid losing many observations. We rely on a dummy variable to capture ihe effect of missing values when using R&D in our analysis.' Utilities (4900-4949) and financial firms (6000-6999) are excluded because they were regulated during most of the sample period. A small number of firms with a format code ' The vast majority of firms with missing R&D are in indtjstncs stich as clothing retailers for which R&D expenditures are likely lo be zero. Capilal expenditures and convenible debt are missing for about 2% of firm years. We set missing capilal expendilures ( 128) and convertible debt (79) to zero. although our results are essentially the same if we exclude firm years with mi.ssing capital expenditures or convertible debt. of 4, 5. or 6 are also excluded from the sample,^ Firm years with beginning-ofyear book assets of less than $10 million, measured in terms of 1998 purchasing power, are also excluded to eliminate very small Hrms and reduce the effect of outliers.' Finally, we exclude firm-year observations for which there was an accounting change for adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 94, which required firms to consolidate off-balance sheet financing subsidiaries."*
B. Summary Statistics of Financing Activities
Summary statistics of financing activities are presented by year because we are interested in the time-series properties. Figure 1 presents financing activifies using information from the balance sheet. Net debt is defined as the change in book debt. Net equity is defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings. Following Baker and Wurgler (2ÍX)2) and Fama and French (2002) . book debt is defined as total liabilities plus preferred stock (10) minus deferred taxes (35) and convertible debt (79), and book equity is total assets less book debt,Î n Figure 1 , the average ratios are the annual averages of net financing scaled by beginning-of-year assets (in percent), and the aggregate ratios are the annual aggregate amount of net financing of all firms scaled by tbe aggregate amount of beginning-of-year total assets (in percent). Figure 1 shows tbat the average net debt increase exceeded 10% of beginning-of-year assets in eight years. The average net equity issuance exceeded 6% in 12 years. The average change in retained earnings shows a declining trend, witb tbe lowest value in 2001. tbe last year of our sample period. Tbe aggregate net debt and equity issuances fiuctuate substantially, witb aggregate net external equity issuance peaking at over 7% of aggregate assets in 2000. The static trade-off theory has been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for the magnitude of tbese fiuctuations. The pecking •Format code 5 is for Canadian hrms, and format codes 4 and 6 are noi delincd in Compustat. To further reduce the effect of outliers, we also drop lirm-year observations with book leverage or market leverage that is negative or greater than one and Tobin's Q that is negative or greater ihan 10. These variables witi be defined later. Our results are robust to whether or not we keep these firm-year observations. "^We exclude 20! such lirm years identified with Compustai footnote codes. The Financial Aci^ounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS No. 94 in late 1^87. Heavy equipment manufacturers ,ind merchandise reiailers were most affeeted by the standard because they made extensive use of Linconsolidated finance subsidiaries. For example. Ford. General Motors. General Eiectriu. and Interiiaiional Business Machines all had a huge increa.se in debt on iheir balance sheels from liscal year 1987 to I yXH. More specifically. Ford had a debt increase of about $93.8 billion, while its end-of-year lolal assets were $45.0 billion in 1987 and $I4.Î.4 billion in 1988. largely because Ford Credit was consolidated under the new standard. This standard also caused some firms lo divest themselves of unconsolidated subsidiaries because otherwise they would violate debt covenant agreements on the maximum amount of leverage, and their returns on assets would appear too low and financial leverage would appear too high.
• When ihe liquidating value of preferred stock (item tO) is missing, we use the redemption value of preferred st (K-k (56) . When the redemption value is also missing, we use ihe carrying value of prelerred stock (130). As one referee noted, convertible preferred stock is more equity-like than straight preferred slock. In iinreported analysis we include the change in ihe carrying value of convertible preferred slock (2t4) in our definition of net equity. Our results remain qualitatively ihe same.
FIGURE 1
Average and Aggregate Financing Activities from the Balance Sheet Net debt is the change in debí and preferred stock . Net equity is the change in equity anO convertible debt (items 6 -181 -10+ 35 +79) minus the change in retained earnings (36). Graph A of Figufe 1 Sfiows the equally weigtiied annual averages of net financing scaled by beginning-of-year assets ol each firm (in percent) Graph B shows the annual aggregate amount of net financing of all (irms in Ihe sample scaled by the aggregate amount of beginn in g-of-year assets (in percent). [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] , when the average net equity issuance was below 2%. As so often happens, however, the pattern on which the pecking order hypothesis was based began to break down shortly after the publication of Myers (1984) . Figure 1 understates securities issues because other firms that are retiring debt or buying back stock lower the averages. Table 1 reports the percentage of firms that are net securities issuers. Issuing firms in a year are defined as those for [36) . The percentages of debt and equity issuers do not necessarily add up to 100 because firms can issue both debt and equity or neither debt nor equity. Firms wilh beg inn in g .-of-year assets of iess than $10 million (1998 purchasing power) are excluded.
Year
Total Number of Firms Debt Issues (%) Equity Issues (%) 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ? which debt or equity Increases by more than 5% of beginning-of-year assets, the same definition that has been used, for example, in Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) . Once we separate firms with net securities issues from other firms, we see a higher frequency of issuing. The percentage of firms with net debt issuance of at least 5% of assets is never below 28%. The pecking order theory predicts that equity issues will be rare. However, the proportion of net equity issuers (firms issuing at least 5% of assets) never drops below 6.6% in any year, peaks at over 34% in 1969, and is at least 25% in each year from 1995 to 2001." "Our proportion of equily issuers is much higher than in studies such as Jung. Kim. and Stul/. ( 1996) and DeAiigelo. DeAngek), and Stulz(20O9}, which define an equily issuer as a lirm conducting a public seasoned equity offering for cash. Our definition of an equity issuer, which is standard in the empiricaJ capital structure literaiure. includes firms that conduct private placements of equity or stock-financed acquisitions that increase the book value of equity by at least 5% of assets, net of share repurchases.
Overall, our summary statistics of financing activities cast doubt on the ability of the pecking order model to describe most of the observed capital structures, consistent with Fama and French (2002) , (2005), Frank and Goyal (2003) , and Hovakimian (2006) .
C. Summary Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables
How do firms judge the relative cost of equity? On the one hand, some firm executives may possess private information that is not reflected in market prices about their firms or their industries. On the other hand, they may follow certain psychological patterns. For example, reference points, as suggested by prospect theory, may play a role.^ Alternatively, they may issue equity to take advantage of publicly observable misvaluations if the equity market becomes temporarily overvalued (Stein (1996) ).
Our proxy for the cost of equity is the implied ERP, estimated using analyst earnings forecasts (earnings per share (EPS) and LTG rate) at the end of the previous calendar year for the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.** The implied ERP is defined as the real internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the present value of all future cash flows to common shareholders of the firm (measured as book value of equity plus forecasted future residual earnings), minus the real risk-free rate (see Appendix A for details). Although they differ in their specific procedures, this is the general approach used by Claus and Thomas (2001) , Gebhardt, Lee. and Swaminathan (2001) . and Ritter and Warr (2002) .'' We follow Ritter and Warr (2002) to correct for inflation-induced distortions in the estimation of the implied ERP. The equally weighted average of Casual conversations with investment bankers suggest thai when they advise their clients on the choice beiween debt and exiernal equity ñiiancing. the most imptmani factors they consider tirtwhether a client's sttKk ptice is near a 52-week high and whether the earnings yield on the stock is hclow the interest rate on debt.
'^By using the lagged year-end values during year / lor a firm with a Dec. 31 fiscal year, we arc using the Dec. Ä: in 1975 to 12.1'^ in 1997 , Using their series instead of ours dt>es not change our major results. Our qualitative results are also robust to using the val tie-weighted bo(»k-to-market ratio of equity for all NYSE-listed firms as a proxy for the relative cost of equity rather than the implied ERP, Consistent wiih the literature, we assume that analyst EPS forecasts are exogenous. Bayesian ;iiialysts, however, may become overly conservative in their forecasts of EPS when the cost of equity is high, and overly optimistic when the cost of equity is low. This is because the market price implies future earnings, and a Bayesian analyst will incorporate these into his or her own forecasts. Funhermore. when P/E ratios are high, more optimistic forecasts are necessary in order to jastify "buy" recommendations. The endogeneity results in a dampening of the time series of the implied ERP relative to its true fluctuations and hence creates a bias against our results. the implied ERP for each of the Dow 30 stocks is u,sed as an estimate of the ERP for the market. The time-variation of the implied ERP may be due to either the time-variation of risk, or of the risk aversion of investors (rational reasons), or to the time-variation of investor sentiment (an irrational reason). Figure 2 shows the real interest rate (RIR) and the implied ERP at the end of each calendar year. The HRP turned negative during 1996-2001. suggesting overvaluation of the stock market.'" Firms display a high propensity to issue equity during these years, as indicated in Table 1 .
FIGURE 2 Equity Risk Premium and Real Interest Rate
The market equity risk premium is estimated using analyst forecasts at the year-enö for ttie Dow 30 stocks from Value Line tor 1968 -1976 and from IBES for 1977 . The real interest rate is the nominal Interest rate minus inflation, whsre the nominal interest rate is the yield on one-year Treasury biiis in the secondary market at the beginning of each calendar year at http://www. fed eral reserve.gov/, and inflation is the rate of change of the consumer pnce inöex during the calendar year Irom CRSP.
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Figure 2 also shows that the RIR was very low in 1973-I974and 1978-1979 , when the percentage of sample firms issuing debt rose to historic highs (over 56% "'Although we eslimate a negative ERP for some years, our qualitative results are not dependen on Ihe ERPs being negative. The residual income methodology that we employ states thai the value of equity is equal to the book value of equity plus the present value of future residual income (economic profits). Because we assume that future residual income i.s mean-revening, a large present vahie of future residual income can only be achieved by using a low discount rate (i.e., since the numerator converges to zero, a small denominator is needed to generate a high ratio). When both the marketto-book ratio and the RIR are high, as was the case in the 1996-2(X)I period, the mixlel produces a negative implieJ ERP. Some have argued that a high market-to-book ratio has existed in most years after 1995 because the book value of equity increasingly underrepresents the value of assets in place as intangibles represent more and more of firm value. 11* so, our estimates may overstate the downtrend in the ERP. and the true HRP may not be as negative as we estimate. Since we use ihe ERP as an explanatory variable, overestimating its decline would lead to underestimating the slope coefficient on Ihe ERP.
for each of these years in Table 1 ). The RIR is used as a proxy for the lime-varying cost of debt perceived by corporate executives.
Previous studies also use the term spread and the defauh spread as proxies for Ihe costs of various forms of debt (e.g.. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)). It is likely that the time-varying default risk premium can help explain the timevarying financing decisions. We thus include the default spread, which is defined as the difference in yields between Moody's Baa-and Aaa-rated corporate bonds. The term spread, defined as the difference in yields between 10-and one-year Treasuries, is also included because firms might increase the use of long-term debt when the term spread is low.
We also include contemporaneous measures of the statutory corporate tax rate and the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. The statutory corporate tax rate has changed over time and may have a major influence on the financing decisions of U.S. firms (see, among others, Graham (2003) and Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) )." The real GDP growth rate controls for growth opportunities. To the degree that these variables are important and have the expected signs, this lends support to the static trade-off model.
The lagged average announcement effect on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is included to see whether, as implied by the pecking order theory, time-varying information asymmetry is able to explain time-varying financing activities. Since the pecking order theory assumes that markets are semi-strong-form efficient, the announcement eifect associated with equity issues is the primary proxy for the level of information asymmetry (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) ). Table 2 reports summary statistics for our proxies for market conditions. The implied ERP is positively correlated with the default spread and the statutory corporate tax rate and is negatively correlated with the RIR.
III. Market Timing and Securities Issuance Decisions
How important are market conditions, especially the ERP, in securities issuance decisions? This section reports and discusses the results from i) annual OLS regressions using a firm's net debt issuance as the dependent variable and its net financing deficit as the independent variable, ii) pooled OLS regressions linking the pecking order slope coefficient to the time-varying cost of capital, and iii) a pooled nested logit regression for the joint decision of whether to issue securities and which security to issue.
A. Pecking Order Tests I
Following Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), we first estimate (1) "The statutory corporate tax rate was 52% in 1963, 50% in 1964, 48% in 1965-1967. 52.8% in 1968-1969.49.2% in 1970.48% in 1971-1978.46% in 1979-1986.40% in 1987.34% in 1988-1992, and 35% in 1993-2001 .
TABLE 2 Summary Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables
ERPi _ 1 is the implied market equity risk premium at the end ot year î -1, eshmated using analyst forecasts for ihe Dow 30 stocks from Value Line for 1968-1976 and from IBES for 1977-2001 RIR,_i is the nommai m lef es I rale minus realized inflation, where the nominal interest rate is the yield (daily series) on one-year Treasury bilis m ttie secondary market at the end of year t -1 al hltp:/Avww fade rai reserve.gov/. and inflation is the rale of change of the consumer price index during year f from CRSP. DSP, _ i is the default spread, defined as the difference in yieids (weskiy series. Since daily series only goes back to 1983) between f^ioody's Baa-rafed and Aaa-ialed corporate bonds al the end of year f -1. TSP,_ t is Ihe term spread, defined as ihe difference in yields (daiiy series) between 10-and one-year constan! maturity Treasuries at the end of year / -1. TAXR, is the statutory corporate lax rale during year t RGOPt is the reai GDP growth rate during year f from tfie Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce RSEO[_i is the annual average of mafket-adjusted returns during year [ -I from one day before to one day after the fiie date of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs], computed by the authors using SEO data from Thomson Financial. The average announcement effect is caiculated from 1980. the first year the file date is available for most SEOs. SubscriQt f denotes the current year and I -1 denotes the previous year TAXR, RGDP, and RIR where ADu is the change in book debt as a percentage of beginning-of-year assets for firm / at the end of the fiscal year ending in calendar year t, and DEF,, is the change in assets minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of beginning-of-year assets. To examine how the slope coefficient on the financing deficit has changed across time, we estimate this equation each year. The estimated slope coefficient, b, known as the pecking order coefficient, shows very interesting time-series patterns and is reported in Figure 3 . It ranges from 0.67 to 0.92 in the 1960s and the 1970s, from 0.48 to 0.79 in the 1980s, and from 0.27 to 0.58 from 1990 to 2(W) I. Frank and Goyal (2003) find that the slope coefficient was low in the 1990s as well. However, a time trend does not explain everything. Even within each decade, there are ups and downs that might be explained with our proxy for the relative cost of equity capital.
Since the effect of market conditions on a negative financing deficit is unclear, we focus on the effect of market conditions on a positive financing deficit by estimating the following regression, pooling all firm year observations: where NDEF,, equals DEF,, if DEF,, < 0 and zero otherwise; PDEF,, equals DEFj, if DEF,f > 0 and zero otherwise: ERP,_ i is the implied market ERP at the end of year/-!;RIR,_i is the expected real interest rate at the end of year/-1; DSP,_ I is the default spread at the end of year / -1 : TSP,_ i is the term spread at tlie end of year / -1; TAXR, is the statutory corporate tax rate during year /; Table 3 . Correlation of the observations across time for a given tirm and correlation across firms for a given year could rcsuh in biased .standard errors in our panel data set regressions. Consequently, we report /-statistics using standard cn'ors corrected for clustering by both firm and year (Petersen (20(19) ).'-Consisteni with the market timing theory, firms finance a large proportion of iheir financing deficif with net external equity when the cost of equity is low\ In Panel .\ of Table 3 . we follow Baker and Wurgler (2002) to define the financing deficit as including dividends and the change in cash (i.e.. higher dividends increase the financing deficit). In regression ( 1 ), the implied ERP at the end of year Í -I is positively related to the pecking order coefficient in year !. \n economic terms, a one-standard-deviation (0.0371 increase in the implied ERP is associated with 10.8% more of the financing deficit being funded with net debt (for example, increasing from 60% to 70.8%). Elliott, Koeter-Kant, and Warr (2007) also '•^Petersen (2009) suggcsis liial lin.' Rogers 11993) standard errors ciustered by firm and by year are more accunitc than uncorrcclL'ci standard errors in the presence of hoth linn and year correlalions in il panel data set. The existing STATA software does not have a built-in command lo corred Ibr two-dimensiona] clustering (lor fxample. clustering hy hoth firm and year). However. MitL-hell Pelersen kindly provides a ST.ATA ado tile used in Petersen (2íH)9) lor two-ditiien.sional ckisterinLi (see http://w ww.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/potcrsen/htm/papcr.s/se/se.programminii.htm). relate the pecking order slope coefficient to the ERP estimated for each Iirm anti lind qualitatively sitiiilar results. Our estimate of the HRP at the market level usint: only the well-esiahlished Dow M) companies wiih reliable accoufiling infortnatioii is relatively conservative and is likely to tnideTstate the impori;tiice oí \ aluation in the choice bctwccti debt and equity. In regression (2) the estimated eoefticient ot) the interaction between the ERP and the positive financing deficit changes little after controlling for the real rate of return on debt, the default spread, the term spread, the statutory tax rate, and the real GDP growth rate. The regression also shows that lirms fund a larger proportion of their financing deficit with net debt when the corporate tax rate is higher, consistent with the trade-off theory prediction that debt is used as a lax shield, although the relation is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the interaction hetween the real rate of GDP growth and the positive financing deficit is positive and statistically significant, suggesfing that firms are more likely to fund their current growth opportunities with debt.
Regression (3) in Table 3 includes the average announcement effect of SEOs as an explanatory variable, using a shorter sample period because our RSEO series does not begin until 1980. This variable measures the adverse selection costs of issuing equity, and has been used by, among others, Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) . Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) , Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) , and Korajczyk and Levy (2(K)3). The significantly negative sign of the interaction between the average announcement effect and the positive financing deficit is consistent with previous studies. That is, when this negative number is closer to zero, firms issue more equity. Economically, a one-standard-dev i at i on (0.005) increase in the average announcement effect results in a decrease of 3>.0% of the financing deficit being funded with net debt. Relative to the impact of the ERP. the average announcement effect (and therefore time-varying asymmetric information) is of secondary importance in the choice of debt and equity financing.
If a firm pays out the cash flow it generated as a dividend, then the financing deficit as defined in Panel A of Table 3 does not include that cash flow because both assets and retained earnings are decreased by the dividend. However, if the firm engages in a stock repurchase, then the financing deficit includes the cash flow because the deficit measures net external financing. In Panel B, we exclude dividends and the change in cash in the definition of the financing deficit (i.e., the payment of dividends does not affect the value of the financing deficit). The coefficient on the interaction between the ERP and the positive financing deficit becomes even larger, suggesting a greater role of the ERP in the choice between external debt and external equity to fund the financing deficit.
The regression approach has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include the summarization of information in the pecking order slope coefficient, convenience for analyzing a large number of firms, and convenience for controlling for other factors in a multivariate framework. The disadvantages include the potentially large influence of a few outliers and the oversimplification of information. Furthermore, Chirinko and Singha (2000) question the validity of Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) pecking order tests.
To gain additional insight, in Figure 4 we randomly select 100 firms each year and draw scatter-plots. We limit the number of randomly selected firms to 100 per year because a larger number makes it difficult to visually identify meaningful patterns. If a firm funds 100% of its financing deficit with net debt, all of the points plotted will lie on the 45° line. A firm with negative net equity issuance will lie on the left-hand side of the 45° line, while a firm with positive net equity issuance will lie on the right-hand side of the 45" line. We report the scatter-plots for only four years because those for other years with similar slope coefficients are qualitatively the same. In 1975, when the slope coefficient is 0.91, only a small number of firms deviate from the 45" line. In 1992, however, when the slope coefficient is 0.42, several percent of the points are far to the right of the 45" line. These firms issue a lot of equity to finance their financing deficit or to retire deht. Only a few firms are noticeably to the left of the 45*^ line, suggesting that firms only infrequently repurchase shares in a quantitatively important manner.
B. Nested Logit Model for the Joint Decision
in the pecking order tests, we assume that the financing deficit is exogenous. However, a firm may decide jointly whether to issue securities and which security to issue. Therefore, we also estimate a nested logit model (Greene (2003), pp. 115-111) . as do Gomes and Phillips (2007) .'-' The nested logit model can also potentially reduce the large influence of a few firms raising a large amount of debt or equity on the pecking order slope coefficient, because firms issuing 6% or '^A nested logil model is similar to a multinomial logit model. However, u multinomial iogii model assumes thai choices between any Iwo alternatives are independent of the other alternatives, while a nested logit model only assumes that the choices are independent within a group or "nest" of alternatives.
60% of assets are both assigned the same value in the nested logit model. Another concern regarding the pecking order tests is that the estimated coefficient from the financing deficit may simply reflect changing firm characteristics rather than changing market conditions (Flannery and Rangan (20() 6)). We control for firm characteristics in the nested logit model. Our nested logit model includes two decision levels. The first-level alternatives are security issuance versus no security issuance, and the second-level alternatives are equity versus deht issuance. Let Pr(i) equal either the probability of security issuance (/ -s) or the probability of tio security issuance (i -n), and Pr(j|i) equal either the probability of equity issuance (j -e) or the probability of debt issuance (j = d) conditional on / = J.'* Then (3) and (4) Pr(.) = '''P(-''" exp{ y¡a + r/j/J where the inclusive values /,-= ln{exp(j:,e/3) -I-exp(jc,y/3)}, JCJ/. and v, refer to the row vectors of explanatory variables specific to categories (/,/') and (/), respectiveiy, and i]i refers to the inclusive parameters. We use nonissuers as the base alternative at the first decision level, and debt issuers as the base alternative at the second decision level. The nested logit model is estimated using full-information maximum likelihood.'Ŵ e use the same set of explanatory variables, including both firm characteristics and market conditions, for all alternatives."' Firm characteristics include financial slack (the sum of cash and short-term investments), profitability, capital expenditures, Tobin's Q (market-to-book ratio of assets). R&D expenditures, the logarithm of net sales, the logarithm of the number of years the firm has been listed on CRSP. the lagged leverage, the market-adjusted return during the previous fiscal year, and the market-adjusted return during the following three fiscal years. The results for the nested logit model aie reported in Table 4 .'^ To assist in gauging economic significance, we vary each explanatory variable by plus or minus one standard deviation from its sample value (a two-standard-deviation change), and then we average the change in the predicted probability over all firms in the sample in order to obtain the economic effects, holding other variables ' "^A firm is defined as issuing debt if the net change in debt is at least 5% of its beginning-ofyear assets. Similarly, a firm is defined as issuing equity if the nei change in equity is at least 5% of its beginning-of-yc;ir asscis. For convenience, lirni years when both debt ;md equiiy are issued arc excluded in the nested logit regressions. For characteristics of linns issuing twHh debt and equity, see Hovakimian cl al. (21) 04). We keep ihese lirms in other analyses, '^Several previous studies examine ihe choice between debt versus equity ñnancing in isolation using a logil model (e.g.. Jung et al. (19961) or a probit mode! (e.g.. Mackie-Mason ( 1990) ), implicitly assuming that the choice between issuing versus not issuing security is exogenous. "•If we restrict both ;;., = I and r;,, = I. then we have a multinomial logit model. '^We are not aware of any statistical packages that are able Eo adjust nested logit irgressions for clustering. We use nonlssuers as the base alternative at the first decision leuei. and debt issuers as the base alternative at the second decision level. Firms that issue botli debt and equity in the same yeaf are excluded (rom the sample, which covers 1969-3301. ^0 is the change in debt and preferred stock . ¿IE is the change in equity and ccnvertibie debt (items 6 -181 -10 + 35 + 79) minus Ihe ctiange in retained earnings (36) A firm is defined as issuing debt if AD/A,^ i > Q.05. Similarly, a tirm is defined as issuing equity if AE/Ai_, > 0.05. CASH is the sum of cash and short-term Investments (1) scaled by assets. OiBD is operating Income before depreciation (13) scaled by assets CAPEX is the capital expenditure (128) scaled by assets. Q is the sum of Ihe market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assels. R&D is the research and development expense (46) scaied by assets and IS set to zero if it is missing. RSDD is a dummy variable that equals one if RSD is missing and equals zero otherwise. SAL£ is the log of net sales (12) AGE is Ihe naturai log of Ihe number of years the tirm has been listed on CRSP BL is book leverage, defined as bcxik debt (items 181 + 10-35-79) scaled by assets MAR^^i is measured as Ihe difference between the tirm raw return and Ihe valu e-weigh ted market return in the preceding fiscal year MAR[.ti,|.,3 is measured as the difference between the firm raw return and the value-weighted market retum in the foliowing three fiscal years. If a firm IS delisted. ils post-event three-year raw return is calculated by compounding the CRSP va i ue-weighted market return for the remaining months. ERP, _ i is the impiied mari<et equity risk premium at ihs end of year ( -1 R[R,_ i is the nominal interest raie minus inflation in year t. DSP, _, is the default spread, defined as ihe difference in yields between Moody's Baa-rated and Aaa-rated corporate bonds at the end cf year f -1. TSP, _ ] is the term spread, defined as the difference in yieids (daiiy series) between 10-and one-year constant maturity Treasuries at Ihe end cf year 1-1. TAXR; is the statutory corporate lax rate during year t. RGDP| is Ihe real GDP growth rate during year f. To help gauge the economic effecls. we vary each explanatory variable from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its sample vaiue. and use the coefficients trom the nested logil regression to calculate the change in the predicted probability, holding all other variables fixed. We then average the change in the predicted probability over ali firms m the sampie to gel economic effecls. The (-statistics are calculated using heieroskedastic consistent standard errors (While (1980) fixed. Because our results are generally consistent with other results in the literature, we will only highlight a few of the results.
We first hriefiy discuss results for the first-level decision: security issuance versus no security issuance. Consistent with the pecking order theory, firms that have more cash and higher profitahility are less likely to access external capital markets, while growth firms, as measured by capital expenditure, Tobín's Q, R&D, and the preissue one-year market-adjusted firm return, are more likely to access external markets. Older firms rely less on external financing. Macroeconomic variables also appear to be important determinants of whether to access external markets.
We proceed to discuss results for the second-level decision: equity issuance versus debt issuance, conditional on the decision of security issuance. Our results are generally consistent with the existing literature. Firms with more cash are more likely to issue equity. Profitable firms are more likely to issue debt. Firms with more growth opportunities, as measured by capital expenditure. Tobin's Q. R&D. and preissue one-year market-adjusted return, are more likely to issue equity. Larger and older firms are more likely to issue debt.
Confirming the importance of market timing. Tobin's Q and the past marketadjusted firm return are among the most important explanatory variables in the decision to issue equity, both statistically and economically. Holding other variables at their sample values, if Tobin's Q is increased from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its sample value, the prof>ensity to issue equity increases by 14.7%. Similarly, if the past market-adjusted firm return is increased from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its sample value, the propensity to issue equity increases by 9.9%. Firms that subsequently underperform are also more likely to issue equity, and this variable has a larger economic significance than most other variables. An increase in the future market-adjusted return from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above results in almost a 6.5% reduction in the propensity to issue equity. This provides further support for the market timing theory.'** Consistent with the static trade-off theory, high leverage firms are more likely to issue equity rather than debt during 1964-2001. If we increase the lagged book leverage from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its sample value, the propensity to issue equity increases by 7.6%.
We are interested in whether the implied ERP has additional explanatory power after controlling for firm characteristics. If the lagged value of the ERF increases from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its sample value, the average propensity to issue equity instead of debt decreases by 10.3%. Economically, it is more significant than all other variables except tbe lagged firm level Tobin's Q.
When the RIR is higher, firms are more likely to issue equity. Economically, an increase from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above "'jungelal. (1996) include the post-issue firm return as a proxy for cxpecied mis valuation in a logit model for finn.s' choice between debt and equity issuance, although they do not find this variable to be staiisticully significant tora small sample of U.S. firms from 1977 to 19S4. Consislenl with our resiills, DeAngelo el al. (2009) also find a statistically significant negative relation beiween the probability of conducting an SEO and future three-year market-adjusted returns for U.S. firms from 1982 to 2001. However, they find that the propensity to issue equity increases by only \.^% for a swing of a 75'ii loss to a 75% gain over three subsequent years, far below our 6.3%. The difference in results appears to be primarily due to two reasons: i) The definitions of equity issuers are difieren!. They use SEOs, whereas we use the change in the bix>k value of equity (net of increases in retained earnings), which includes private placements and stock-financed acquisitions, ii) Their \.5% is the percent of equity issuers among all firms, while our 6.5% is the percent of equity issuers aniong debt issuers and equity its sample value is associated with an increase of 3.8% in the propensity to issue equity. The defauit and term spreads have an even more modest effect on the debt versus equity choice. Inconsistent with the static trade-off theory that views the lax rate as a major factor in the decision to issue debt, the tax rate has only a secondary effect on the propensity to issue debt or equity.
The statistical and economic importance of our cost of capital proxies is consistent with the hypothesis that firms time their securities offerings to take advantage of intertemporal variation in the relative cost of different sources of capital. One could also interpret these results as being consistent with the static irade-off model, with firms moving to a new optimum as the relative costs of debt und equity change. Traditionally, researchers have assumed that the relative costs do not vary over time. Instead, researchers have assumed that firm characteristics might change over time, but the market-determined costs of debt and equity do not change.
In summary, the nested logit results in Table 4 suggest that Tobin's Q. the preissue stock price run-up, and the implied ERP are the three most important determinants of firms' choice between equity and debt.'^ This is consistent with the market timing theory, although not necessarily inconsistent with the static tradeoff theory with an optimal target that depends on the time-varying relative costs of debt and equity and growth opportunities. To further distinguish the alternative theories, in the next section we investigate how historical market conditions influence a firm's current leverage through their important role in the firm's historical financing activities.
IV. Effects of Market Timing on Capital Structure
Firms may adjust their capital structure with internal funds or external funds. The pecking order theory posits that external funds are more expensive than internal funds and external equity is more expensive than external debt. Therefore, securities issues, especially equity issues, should be rare and only have a material impact on the capital structure of firms with insufficient internal funds. The market timing theory is similar to the pecking order theory in that observed capital structure is the outcome of historical external financing decisions, rather than a primary goal in itself.
In contrast, in the static trade-oft" theory, firms issue securities to adjust toward their target leverage. Once target leverage and partial adjustment are properly controlled for, past securities issues and market conditions should have no important impact on current leverage (although with adjustment costs. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) . Hennessy and Whited (2005) , Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005), Leary and Roberts (2005) , Strebulaev (2007) .
'''We did several robusttiess checks: i) using a multinomial logit model even if our unrcported test shows ihai choices between any iwo altematives are not independent of the other alternatives; ii) using Ihe value-weighted market-to-b(xik ralio of equity of all N YSE-listed timis prior to fiscal year / as an alternative proxy for the cost ofequily at the market level; iii) including convertible preferred stock in equity; and iv) excluding firm-year observations with major mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs. Our results are not qualitatively affected.
and others allow for a roie). Therefore, it is important to examine the effects of past securities issues and market conditions on observed capital structures in order to compare the relative strength of each theory. This is especially important because there is widespread agreement that market timing considerations appear to be important in determining securities issues (see Alti (2006) and Hovakimian (2004) . (2006), among others). The main debate is regarding the persistence of the effects of securities issues and market conditions on capital structure.
To control for target leverage when estimating the effects of past securities issues on current leverage, we estimate the following regression:
where L-,, is the leverage ratio of firm / at the end of year t, k is the lag length in ycitrs. PDEFy,_i equals DEF,V_Í if DEF,,_A > 0 and zero otherwise (DEF,V_A is the change in assets minus the change in retained earnings scaled by beginning-ofyear assets for firm Í in year i-^), and ERPf_i_i is the implied ERP at the end of year t -k-1. Target leverage proxies include lagged firm characteristics, lagged or current macroeconomic variables, and year dummies. We examine whether the ERPÄ+I years ago and firm /'s financing deficit Ä: years ago still have an impact on the firm's current leverage. The static trade-off theory predicts that the coefficients on ERP,^t_i X PDEF,,_i and PDEF/i-t should be insignificant when k is large. The market timing theory predicts that the effect of ERP,..i._ ] x PDEF,,_;(. on year i leverage should be positive and statistically significant until k becomes very large. Table 5 reports pooled OLS results with book leverage (Panel A) or market leverage (Pane! B) as the dependent variable for k -0, 4, 6. and 8. To remove the effects of clustering on the estimated standard errors, we report /-statistics corrected for correlation both across observations of a given firm and across observations of a given year (Petersen (2(X)9)). Since the results regarding the target leverage proxies are generally consistent with previous studies, we focus our discussions on the effects of the historical ERPs and financing deficits. Also, we focus our discussions on book leverage, since there is evidence that firms only slowly undo the effect on market leverage induced by stock price movements (Welch (2004) ). In the market leverage regressions, the large /-statistics on Q are partly due to the mechanical relation induced by the market value of equity being in tbe numerator of Q and the denominator of the dependent variable.
The regression ( I ) results with /: -0 are generally consistent with the results in Table 3 . The coefficient on the interaction between the ERP and the financing deficit is statistically significant. The effect of the financing deficit on book leverage is (3.687 X ERP,_| + 0.242) x PDEF,,. Con.sistent with the market timing theory, the effect of the financing deficit on leverage is positively related to the implied ERP. The minimum estimated ERP is -0.043 (-4.3% per year) in 1999, and the maximum is 0.114 (11.4% per year) in 1974. For a firm with a financing deficit of 10% (the sample mean) in 1999. the effect on its book leverage is (3.687 X ( -0.043) +0.242) x 10% = 0.83%. For a firm with a financing deficit of 10% in 1974. the effect on its book leverage is (3.687 x 0.114 + 0.242) x 10% = 6.62%. Thus, die financing deficit results in a smaller increase in book leverage when the cost of equity is low (1999) than when the cost of equity is high (1974). a pattern not predicted by the pecking order hypothesis. The total effect of the ñnancing deficit on market leverage in Panel B also depends on the magnitude of the ERP. although the quantitative effect is smaller. In regression (2) with k ^ 4, the effect of the financing deficit five years ago on current hook leverage is (2.170 x ERP,_5-f 0.044) x PDEFif_4. For example, a \0% financing deficit in 1996, when the implied ERP was low, would increase a linn's book leverage five years later by only (2.170 x (-0.004)+0.044) x 10% = 0.35%. In contrast, a 10% deficit in 1974, when the implied HRP was high, would increase book leverage five years later by (2.170 x O.I 14 + 0.044) x 10% = 2.91%. The difference in the impact on book leverage of the 10% financing deficit between 1974 and 1996 is 2.56%.
The difference in the impact is economically significant. In our sample, the standard deviation of the change in book leverage during one year is only 10.08%. consistent with the high persistence in leverage documented by, among others. Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Lemmon et al. (2008) ). Relative to the standard deviation, a 2,56% difference in leverage is not a small number. It should be noted that the role of the cost of equity capital is understated in this paper because our measure at the market level does not capture the cross-sectional variations at the firm level.
The eoefficient on the interaction term continues to be statistically significant in regression (3) with k = 6, suggesting that the ERP six years ago still has an impact on current leverage. The coefficient on the interaction term becomes much smaller in regression (4) with k = ^, however, reassuringly suggesting that the ERP's effect on future leverage does not implausibly persist forever. Hovakimian (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) suggest that the importance of the external finance weighted average of historical market-to-hook ratios in Baker and Wurgler (2002) is driven by the mean value of historical market-tobook ratios. They argue that the historical mean market-to-book ratio captures the cross-sectional variation in growth opportunities, which is one of the major determinants of long-term target leverage. Our measure of the cost of equity capital al the market level largely captures time-series variations instead of cross-sectional variations. The long-lasting effect of historical ERPs through their influence on financing decisions is inconsistent with the static trade-off theory, although it is not necessarily inconsistent with a dynamic trade-off theory with costly adjustment.
Our results also complement those of Alti (2006), who restricts his analysis to firms that have issued equity. It is possible that at least some debt issuers issued debt instead of equity because of a high ERP. Therefore, although using only equity issuers lo examine the impact of market conditions on capital structure is informative, it provides an incomplete picture.
V. Estimating the Speed of Adjustment
In the previous section, we regress leverage on a set of variables that predict leverage in order to generate a target leverage equation. In the Table 5 analysis, we do not control for firm fixed effects. It is possible that past securities issues capture unobserved firm characteristics that determine current target leverage. If this is true, then the persistent effects of past securities issues are consistent with the trade-off theory. Among recent studies, Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate a dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects to address this issue.
The dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects can be summarized in tbe following two structural equations, assuming that target leverage is determined by observed firm characteristics and unobserved characteristics that are captured by firm fixed effects:
where L,, is the leverage ratio of firm / at the end of year i, TL,, is target leverage, Q-, is the firm fixed effect, and X¡,_\ is a vector of lagged firm characteristics of firm Í, current or lagged macroeconomic variables, and year dummies. If TL/, is observable, then we can estimate equation (6) to find the SOA toward the target capital structure, 7. Unfortunately, we cannot observe target leverage. Therefore, we have to rely on a reduced form specification:
Two properties are well established for a dynamic panel in which the lagged dependent variable is an explanatory variable (Hsiao (2003) ). First, the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable with a pooled OLS estimator ignoring firm fixed effects is biased upward under reasonable assumptions. Second, the estimated coefficient using the standard approach of mean differencing the model is biased downward, especially when the time dimension is short (Nickell ( 1981 ) ). In essence, the mean differencing estimator first takes the mean for each firm:
It then subtracts equation (9) from equation (8) to get rid of firm fixed effects:
Since tbe average firm has continuous Compustat data for only about six years, the coefficient on L,,_ |, 1 -7, may be biased substantially downward. Recognizing this problem, Flannery and Rangan (2006) focus on market leverage ratios and use lagged book leverage as an instrument for their lagged dependent variable, lagged market leverage. They report an SOA toward target market leverage of 35.5% per year (regression (7) in Table 5 ). It is not clear, however, that lagged book leverage is a valid instrument for lagged market leverage, because at least some shocks are likely to affect both book leverage and market leverage. Similarly, they report an SOA toward target book leverage of 34.2% per year (regression (2) of Table 5 ),
With a large dynamic panel data set, we are able to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated adjustment speed with respect to the time dimension with some experiments. We first focus only on firms with data for exactly five consecutive years in Panel A of Table 6 . For book leverage, the adjustment speed is 15.6% per year ( I -0.844, v/here 0.844 is the coefficient on lagged book leverage) when the pooled OLS estimator ignoring firm fixed effects is used; the adjustment speed is 73.8% per year when the mean differencing estimator is used. For market leverage, the adjustment speed is 13.6% using the pooled OLS estimator ignoring firm fixed effects and 76.5% using the mean differencing estimator. The gap between the OLS estimates and the mean differencing estimates, which are biased in opposite directions, is huge. The first equation is estimated using the pooled OLS estimator. The second equation is estimated using the mean differencing OLS estimator. The dependent variable is either book leverage or market leverage of firm i al the end of year I Book leverage (BL) is defined as book debt {items 181+10 -35 -79) divided by book assets (item 6) Market leverage {ML) is defined as book debt divided by market assets {items 181 -• 10 -35 + 25 x 199). X includes lagged firm characteristics, market conditions, and year dummies, Û is Ihe sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. R&D is the research and development expense (46) and is set to zero if it is missing, R&DD is a dummy variable that equals one if R&D is missing and equals zero otherwise, CAPEX IS the capital expenditure {128) SALE is the log of net sales (12). OIBD is the operating fncome before depreciation (13), TANG is the net property, planl, and equipment (8) R&D, CAPEX, OIBD, and TANG are scaled by assets, ERP,_ i is the implied market equity risk premium at the end of year t -1 RIR,_i is the nominal interest rate at the end ol year t -1 minus inflation in year r, DSP, _, is the default spread at the end of year I -1. T3Pi_i is the term spread at the end of year ( -1. TAXRi is the statutory corporate tax rate during year f. RGDP, is the real QDP growth rate during year f Panel A presents results for firms listed on For brevity, the coefficients on year dummies and the intercept are not reported For the mean differencing regressions, the "within' Rŝ tatistics {i,e., R statistics from running OLS on the mean differenced data) are reported The pooled OLS t-5tatistics use heleroskedastic consistent standard errors (White (1980) , further adjusted for correlation across observations ol a given firm (Rogers ¡1993) ,3
In Panel B of Table 6 . we keep only the 425 firms continuously listed on Compustat for 30 years from 1972 to 2001. While the OLS estimator ignoring firm fixed effects suggests a slightly slower adjustment toward target book leverage for this longer panel of firms than for tbe short panel (9.3% per year for firms with 30 years of data vs. 15.6% per year for firms witb five years of data in Panel A), when tbe mean differencing estimator is implemented, a mucb slower SOA is estimated for firms witb 30 years of data than for firms with five years of data ( 19.7% per year in Panel B vs. 73 .8% per year in Panel A). Even though the implied SOA using the mean differencing estimator is biased upwards in Panel B, it still provides an adjustment speed of only 19.7% per year for book leverage and 24.6% for market leverage. Tbe gap between tbe OLS estimates ignoring tirm fixed effects and tbe mean differencing estimates is greatly reduced for tbis longer panel of firms. If the true adjustment speed lies between the OLS estimates ignoring firm fixed effects and tbe mean differencing estimates, tbe results here suggest a mucb slower adjustment speed tban is suggested in Flannery and Rangan (2006) . II should be noted that not all the differences between Panels A and B are necessarily due to the differential time dimension bias. Panel A is intensive in recent IPOs, whereas Panel B is not. To address this issue, in Panel C we further examine the 425 firms that are continuously listed on Compustat from 1972 U) 2001, In the regressions, we restrict the use of data to a five-year period from 1997 to 2001 for these relatively old firms. The estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable using the mean differencing estimator are close to those in Panel A and substantially different from those in Panel B, suggesting that the main reason for the different results between Panels A and B is the difference in the time dimension, rather than the longevity of the firms. We also restrict the use of data to other five-year periods (1972-1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1987-1991. and 1992-1996) for the same 425 firms. These unreported results are essentially the same as what we obtain for the period 1997-2001.
To avoid the short time dimension bias, early studies focus on first-differenced instrumental estimators and GMM estimators (Anderson and Hsiao (1981) . Arellano and Bond (1991) , among others). These estimators rely on first differencing or related transformations to eliminate an unobserved firm-specific effect, and use lagged values of endogenous or predetermined variables as instruments for first differences. However, these estimators are found to incur substantial finite sample biases when the autoregressive parameter is close to one, largely because first differences of highly persistent data series are close to being innovations. These estimators are thus not reliable for our data because firm leverage is highly persistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) propose a system GMM estimator (also called extended GMM), which imposes additional moment restrictions. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that the system GMM estimator performs better with persistent data series than first differencing estimators. This is the procedure used by Antoniou et al. (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) .
Specifically, the system GMM estimator takes the first difference of equation (8):
Equations (8) and ( 11) are then simultaneously estimated as a "system." The system GMM estimator uses the lagged differences (¿«_2 -¿if-3, -•. ^/i -^ÍÜ) ^î nstruments for equation (8) and the lagged levels (¿,7-2, • • •, ¿.¡o) as instruments for equation (11) . The set of moment conditions for the system GMM estimator tends to explode as the time dimension increases, however, resulting in finite sample problems.-" Proper choices of a smaller set of moment restrictions could help (e.g., Antoniou et al. (2008) ). although the literature has not yet provided clearcut guidelines for such choices when implementing the system GMM estimator, Roodman (2009) cautions that the system GMM estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable could be very sensitive to the choice of instruments. Hahn et al. (2007) show that the usual first-order asymptotic advice of using the full set of moment conditions does not provide proper guidance in the dynamic -'*A finite sample may have insufficient information to estimate a large instrument matrix. Also, a large set of instruments could overfit the endogenous variables.
panel data model when the autoregressive parameter is close to one. They also show that a long differencing estimator, which alleviates the problem of weak instruments and relies on a smaller than the fnll set of moment conditions, is much less biased than the GMM estimators. In a simulation, they show that if ihe true autoregressive parameter is 0.9, the system GMM estimate is only 0.664, whereas the long differencing estimator produces an estimate of 0.902 with the difterencing length of k = 5.
Note that leverage at the end of year r -A-is determined by the following equation:
112)
Lí,_É = (1 -'y)Li,-k-\ Subtracting equation (12) from equation (8), we obtain
The long differencing technique estimates equation (14) with iterated two-stage least squares (2SLS) (see Appendix B for details).
In Figure 5 , we show the results of simulations that demonstrate the magnitude of the bias in the estimated SOA when either i) a pooled OLS estimator ignoring firm fixed effects is used, ii) a mean differencing (or within-group) estimator is used, or iii) a long differencing estimator is used. The data-generating process is given by
where L,,, -NORMAL(0.25,().25), TL, -NORMALiO.25,0.25), and £" -NORMAL(0,0.1). The simulations are repeated 10,000 limes, each time using 1.000 firms and 10 years of data for each firm. The values plotted are the firstorder autoregressive coefficients, so subtracting each from 1.0 gives the SOA. In Graph A, we do not restrict the actual level to be between 0 and 1, whereas in Graph B, we do. Inspection of the graphs shows that this restriction is relatively unimportant. The simulations show that without fixed effects, the estimated SOA is biased downwards (since the estimated autoregressive parameter is biased upwards), and that the estimated SOA using a mean differencing estimator is biased upwards, with the bias being especially large for slow true speeds. These results corroborate Welch's (2007) findings. Consistent with Hahn et al. (2007) , the long differencing estimator works well even when the autoregressive parameter is close to one. Therefore, we implement the long differencing technique. We report the results in Table 7 .^' Using differencing lengths of it=4, 8. 18. and 28 years. Panel A -' In unreportecl analy^iis, we did two robustness checks. First, we tried not to include the changes in ihe iiiacrocconomic variables as explanatoiy variables. Second, we excluded firm-year observations with major mergers and acquisitions and spin-iitïs. The esiimates for the SOA are qualitatively the
FIGURE 5
The Estimated Speed of Adjustment as a Function of the True Speed Simulations tor Ihe estimated speed ol adjustment (SOA) with i} OLS and no firm fixed effects, ii) the firm fixed effeci'. mean differencing estimalor (also known as the wilhin-group estimator), and iii) the long diHerencing estimator. The vaiue; plotted are the fifst-order autoregressive coefficients, so subtracting each from 1 0 gives the SOA. The da ta-gen eral in g process IS given by í_,r = {t -7)L,,_i +-/TL, + e«, where L,() ~ NORMAL ( The dependent variable is the change in either book leverage or market leverage Between the end of year ( and the end of year I -ii of firm / (fi = 4, 6, 18, or 28). Book leverage is defined as book debt (items 181 + 10 -35 -79) divided by l)ook assets (item 6). Market leverage is defined as book debt divided by market assets (items 181 + 10 -35 + 25 x 199), X includes lagged firm characterisfics, lagged or current market conditions, and year dummies. Q is the sum of the market value of equity and Ihe book value of debt divided by the book value of assets R&D is the research and development oxpense (46) scaled by assets and is set to zero if it is missing, R&DD is a dummy variable that equals one if R&D is missing and equals zero otherwise CAPEX is the capital expenditure (128), SALE is the log of net sales (12), OIBD is the operating income before depreciation (13), TANG is Ihe net property, plant, and equipment (8). R&D, CAPEX, OIBD, and TANG are scaled by assets, ERP,_, is the implied market equity risk premium at the end of year 1 -1 Rm,_, is the nominal interest rate at the end of year t -1 minus inflation in year I. DSP,_ i is the default spread at the end of year I -1 rSPr _ 1 is the lerm spread at the end of year f -1, TAXR, is the statutory corporate tax rate during year ( RGDP, is the real GDP growth rate during year [. Some year dummies are dropped to avoid multicollinearity. For brevity, the coefficients on year dummies are not reported. The (-statistics use heteroskedastic consistent standard errors, further adjusted for correiation across observations of a given firm (White (1980) . Rogers (1993) presents the results using book leverage. The long differencing estimator provides an estimated SOA that is much less sensitive to the time dimension than the mean differencing estimator. Depending on the differencing length, the estimated SOA toward target book leverage varies from 11.5% to 21.1% per year. Panel B presents the results for market leverage. Tbe estimated SOA toward target market leverage varies from 15.6% to 23.2%. In botb panels, tbe sensitivity of tbe estimates to tbe differencing length is partly because different firms are examined. Foi regressions with k= 18 or 28, one could argue tbat a firm fixed effect is unlikely to be invariant for 20 or 30 years. Tbe vast majority of firms used in regressions with it ^ 8 do not have at least 20 years of data, however, so tbe assumption of a time-invariant firm fixed effect should be a less important issue. Witb A = 8, tbe long differencing estimates of the SOA are 17.0% per year for book debt ratios and 23.2% per year for market debt ratios.
Intuitively, it seems strange thai tbe SOA is faster with market debt ratios tban witb book debt ratios, given tbat Welcb (2004) demonstrates tbat firms do not actively offset increases in tbe market value of equity caused by stock price increases. Perbaps firms whose market debt ratios precipitously increase due to ;i stock price decrease either see the stock price recover and remain in the sample, or drop out of the sample due to financial distress or being taken over. Tbe resulting sample selection bias would create a bias toward estimating a bigb SOA. Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and Chen and Zhao (2007) also question whether evidence of mean reversion in debt ratios is conclusive evidence of targeting a debt ratio, rather than just a manifestation of a mechanical relation if firms arc financing randomly or semirandomly. Tbe evidence in our Table 4 on tbe securities issuance decision, however, suggests that firms are not financing randomly. Chang and Dasgupta (2009) also show that some of the evidence in tbe actual data can only be replicated if tbeir simulation samples are modified to accommodate market timing behavior.
By comparing tbe data in Tables 6 and 7 . we can get estimates of the magnitude of tbe biases using OLS without fixed effects and tbe mean differencing method, relative to the long differencing estimates. When k ^ 28, the long differencing estimate of tbe SOA for book debt ratios is 11.5%, wbicb is above tbe Table 6 , Panel B, OLS estimate without fixed effects of 9.3% and below the mean differencing estimate of 19.7%. When k = 28. the long differencing estimate tor market value of 15.6% is above tbe Table 6 , Panel B, OLS estimate without fixed effects of 11.0% and below the mean differencing estimate of 24.6%. Tbis confirms that tbe OLS estimates ignoring firm fixed effects understate tbe SOA, while the mean differencing estimates overstate the SOA.
To facilitate comparisons, estimates of the SOA in existing empirical studies of capital structure for U.S. firms are reported in Table 8 . Fama and French (2002) and Kayban and Titman (2007) use OLS ignoring firm fixed effects. As discussed earlier, tbese estimates are likely to be biased downwards. Tbe other four papers control for firm fixed effects: Flannery and Rangan (2t}06) use the mean differencing (or witbin-group) estimator; Antoniou et al. (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) use tbe system GMM estimator; and this paper uses tbe long differencing estimator. As we discussed earlier, tbe mean differencing and system GMM estimates are likely to be biased upwards. Consistent with these predictions, the long differencing estimates for the SOA are much lower than the mean differencing and the system GMM estimates, and higher than the OLS ignoring firm fixed effects estimates. Kayhan and Titman (2007) are compiled as ihe compounded annual speed that achieves the five-year SOA that they report in their Table 2 ,41% for book leverage and 35% lor market leverage (l,e , 0,90^ =0,59, andO.9t7= =0 65) The eslimate from Antoniou et al (2008) 
VI. Conclusion
The pecking order theory predicts that external equity is used as the last resort. Under the market timing theory, equity issues are not necessarily more expensive than debt issues when the equity risk premium (ERP) is low. Furthermore, firms may want to raise funds when the cost of equity is low in order to build a ,stockpile of internal funds. Consistent with the market timing theory, we iind that firms fund a larger proportion of their financing deficit with net external equity when the expected ERP is lower.
When we estimate leverage regressions, we find that historical ERPs have long-lasting effects on leverage through their influence on securities issuance decisions, even after controlling for firm characteristics that have been identified as Ihe most important determinants of capital structure. When a Hrm funds a smaller proportion of its financing deficit with debt, which occurs when the market ERP is lower, leverage is lowered for many subsequent years, with the impact gradually diminishing over time. This finding provides further support for the market timing theory.
We also reconcile the different findings on the speed of adjustment (SOA) toward target leverage In Fama and French (2002) , Kayhan and Titman (2007) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) , Antoniou, Guney. and Paudyal (2008) . and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) . Flannery and Rangan (2006) , using a mean differencing estimator, and Antoniou et al. (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) , using a system GMM estimator, find a much faster SOA toward a target capital structure than do Fama and French (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) , who use OLS without firm fixed effects. All three of ihe methods used are biased when some of the firms in the data set are present for a small number of years and when leverage is highly persistent. The quantitative extent of the biases can be large.
We reduce the biases due to a short time dimension and a highly persistent dependent variable by instead using the long differencing procedure introduced by Hahn, Hausman. and Kuersteiner (2007) . They show that this estimator is much less biased than conventional GMM estimators for a dynamic panel, especially when the dependent variable is highly persistent. The application of this new technique to our data suggests that fimis adjust slowly tovtard their target leverage. Using a differencing length of A' = 8. we estimate an SOA of 17.0% per year for book leverage and 23.2% per year for market leverage. These numbers imply a half-life of 3.7 and 2.6 years, respectively, to remove the effect of a shock to target capital structure.
Our estimates of the SOA toward target debt ratios suggest that firms do move toward target debt ratios, although at a moderate pace. Our evidence implies that both the market timing model and the static trade-off model are importani determinants of capital structure. In periods when the eost of equity is high, such as [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . firms act as if they follow a pecking order model with a strict preference for debt when external financing is needed. In periods when the cost of equity is lower, however, the pecking order model fails as a descriptive model of how firms behave.
The long differencing estimator has far-reaching implications extending beyond capital structure research. Existing empirical studies of corporate payout and investment policies using dynamic models suffer from a similar short time dimension bias. A long differencing estimation of such models would shed lighi on issues such as how much earnings firms pay out to shareholders, how quickly firms adjust toward a long-term target payout ratio, and why firms smooth dividends. 
